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Detlev Lück
Walking the tightrope
Combining family life, career and job mobility
1
Drahtseilakte
Vereinbarkeit von Familie, Beruf und beruflicher Mobilität
Abstract:
The article examines the ways in which job mo-
bility affects the relationship between dual ca-
reers and parenthood and the ability of couples to
realise both. Based on survey data from the proj-
ect Job Mobilities and Family Lives in Europe for
six countries (Germany, France, Spain, Poland,
Switzerland, Belgium), bivariate analyses com-
pare ratios of couples with children and/or one or
two careers between couples confronted with job
mobility in the husband’s or wife’s job and those
who have no such mobility. Multivariate analyses
test the influence of job mobility and other rele-
vant circumstances on female employment as
well as on having children. Indicators measuring
respondents’ subjective evaluation of the influ-
ences are reviewed to confirm the results. The re-
sults suggest that couples tend to be childless
rather than give up one partner’s job if the two
goals are incompatible. Job mobility, as with
other unfavourable circumstances, reduces the
ability of couples to combine both, and this abil-
ity is much more reduced if the woman is job
mobile than if the man is. In addition, national
context matters for level of compatibility and for
strength of effects.
Zusammenfassung:
Der Artikel untersucht den Einfluss beruflich
bedingter Mobilität auf das Verhältnis von Dop-
pelverdienern und Elternschaft und auf die Fähig-
keit von Paaren, beides zu realisieren. Anhand von
Umfragedaten des Projektes Job Mobilities and
Family Lives in Europe für sechs Länder (Deutsch-
land, Frankreich, Spanien, Polen, Schweiz, Bel-
gien) vergleichen bivariate Analysen Paare, die
entweder durch den Beruf des Mannes oder den
der Frau mit Mobilität konfrontiert sind, mit Paa-
ren, die nicht davon betroffen sind, hinsichtlich
der Anteile von Eltern, von Ein- und von Dop-
pelverdiener-Paaren. Multivariate Analysen tes-
ten den Einfluss von beruflicher Mobilität und
anderen relevanten Bedingungen auf die Erwerbs-
tätigkeit von Frauen sowie auf Elternschaft. Indi-
katoren werden gesichtet, die die Beurteilung der
Befragten erfassen, um die Befunde zu erhärten.
Der Artikel kommt zu dem Schluss, dass Paare
eher kinderlos bleiben als eine der beiden
Erwerbstätigkeiten aufzugeben, wenn beides
nicht miteinander vereinbar ist. Ähnlich wie an-
dere nachteilige Umstände vermindert berufliche
Mobilität die Fähigkeit von Paaren, beides zu
vereinbaren. Wenn die Frau beruflich mobil ist,
ist der Effekt weitaus stärker, als wenn der Mann
mobil ist. Auch der nationale Kontext macht
einen Unterschied: sowohl für den Grad der Ver-
einbarkeit im Allgemeinen wie auch für die
Stärke der Effekte.
                                                       
1 I would like to thank Silvia Ruppenthal for helpful comments!
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Combining paid work with family life or a job career with a family career is, in general, a
challenge. This difficult relationship is being studied under the broad headline of work-
life or, more precise, work-family issues. Challenges can be studied on two levels, which
I want to refer to as compatibility and work-family balance. The focus on compatibility
asks whether or not people who wish to have children and a job are capable of realising
both. This question, formulated from an individual perspective, is a challenge in contem-
porary societies, predominantly for women. From a couple’s perspective, the question is
whether or not a two-career household and parenthood can be realised, assuming that both
partners hope to do so. The focus on the work-family balance assumes that people have a
job and a family and asks whether or not people are able to invest enough time and energy
into both spheres to meet the respective goals and role expectations in a satisfying way.
Both kinds of challenges shall be subsumed by the term work-family conflicts. The nor-
mative concern that motivates this kind of research is that career jobs are demanding more
resources than people are able to invest without neglecting their family lives.
Empirical results often confirm this concern. However, effects vary, of course, ac-
cording to diverse circumstances, such as the work situation, national context, or gender
(Schieman et al. 2003; Schiemann/Glavin 2008; Voydanoff 2004; Gareis et al. 2003;
Crompton/Lyonette 2006; Hill et al. 2004).2  There may be various consequences: If par-
ents feel unable to invest enough time and energy into their families, they will perceive
role conflicts. They may also suffer from stress and their partnership quality, as well as
the relationship with their children, may sustain damage. If childless couples perceive the
two spheres as being incompatible, they may postpone their family plans or remain
childless. Alternatively, if people refuse to cut back on their family investments, they may
run into conflicts at work or even feel the need to reduce or interrupt their job career. This
is a prioritisation that mostly women make (Maume 2006; Schiemann/Glavin 2008; Rey-
nolds 2005; Gareis et al. 2003). On the macro level, low and decreasing fertility rates and
increasing rates of separation and divorce, as well as low employment rates among moth-
ers, may be the consequences. In many European countries, there are low birth rates and
high and increasing numbers of couples that remain childless, especially among dual-
income couples and among highly educated individuals (Huinink 2009; Frejka/Sobotka
2008; Dorbritz 2000). Divorce rates have also been increasing (Andersson 2003; Höpflin-
ger/Fux 2007). In some countries more than in others, women still tend to leave the labour
market after the first child is born (Lück 2009; Schulz/Blossfeld 2006). These observa-
tions could be interpreted as the effects of low or even decreasing compatibility.
There are several explanations why compatibility, in fact, could be decreasing. One
reason is the increasing labour market participation of women. Between the early 1960s
and today, the standard female life course has been transformed from that of a full-time
mother and housewife concept to the pattern of steady employment, even with varying
                                                       
2 It is also noted that people may feel overcharged by their family’s demands and escape from stress
at home by working extra hours (Hochschild 1997).
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speed and timing in various European societies (Lück 2009). This change is a main reason
why work-family conflicts occur in their contemporary form at all (cp. following section).
A second reason is attributed to a change in the social construction of parenthood. In
some European societies, such as West Germany, expectations regarding what parents
need to offer their children in order to be good parents have become much more de-
manding, while public support for parenting remains scant (Schneider 2002). A third rea-
son is a change in the organisation of paid work. As third- and fourth-sector jobs (i.e.,
service and knowledge-based positions) are being held by more and more people, work
contracts are often time-limited and bound to project funding (Blossfeld et al. 2008) and
work time is typically organised flexibly, in the sense that work requirements cause un-
foreseen overtime. Work time expands (for those who have work, as long as they have
work) and becomes less predictable (Hielscher 2003).
All of these processes and others have the consequence that men and especially
women are required to invest more time and energy into parenting as well as into a suc-
cessful job career. At the same time, structural support for parenting in many European
countries has not increased in a comparable way. Public childcare is not available for all
children, especially those who are very young, in all countries. The hours that children are
cared for in kindergartens or schools are often inflexible and too short for both parents to
maintain a full-time job. The work hours are often inflexible in a way that the employee
cannot adjust them according to his or her needs; instead they are rather flexible in a way
that the employer or the customer can do that. There are hardly institutionalised solutions
for taking care of children during school vacations. There is also a lack of role models for
successfully combining a job and a family career.
One aspect that may also be an important reason for decreasing compatibility has
been overlooked for most of the time: professional career-related spatial mobility re-
quirements. The labour markets in contemporary economies do not only demand flexibil-
ity in terms of time, but often also in terms of space. A large share of employees in
Europe is affected by mobility, and their share has been increasing (Lück/Schneider in
this issue; Lück/Ruppenthal 2010). Partly it is the occupation itself that involves travel,
more often it is a large distance between home and the workplace that is caused, for ex-
ample, by a job change or by two distant workplaces of two employed partners. Workers
who are spatially mobile for the job invest extra time and energy into this mobility. These
resources are lost for both the job and family life. Therefore, mobility should intensify
work-family conflicts.
Does job-related spatial mobility decrease compatibility? In what way does it affect
the relationship between career jobs and family lives? Does it foster childlessness or, in-
stead, does it lead to more discontinuous career jobs? These questions are discussed in the
following. The focus is rather on (in)compatibility – the more fundamental category of
work-family conflicts about whether or not career ambitions and family plans can be re-
alised at all – than on “balancing” problems, such as how parents manage a career and
children in everyday life. Before searching for answers to these questions, a short histori-
cal-theoretical reflection shall clarify where and how to look for them.
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Reflection about the history of work-family relationships, concluding in a
methodological remark
The relationship between professional work and family life has always presented a chal-
lenge. However, the conflict was not always a topic, partly because priorities were clear
and partly because the distinction between the two spheres was not made. In the follow-
ing, this history is outlined by describing three ideal type stages of work-family relation-
ships. They rather represent normative concepts, not necessarily solutions that were put
into practice by most people. They correspond to three ideal type stages of societal devel-
opment: the agricultural, the industrial, and the post-industrial society.
In pre-modern agricultural societies, at least for a large majority of people, the family
and other non-related household members were a community in which not only household
duties and reproduction, but also production, took place. If it is possible to use these terms
in this context at all, “professional work” – mainly farming or craft – was done within the
household. It was not perceived as competing with “family life;” instead, it was a main
part of it. A distinction between the two spheres was not made, and work-family conflicts
were not addressed as such.
Conflicts were also not visible because the expectations were very uneven and priori-
ties were clear. The economic survival of the household was unsecure, so that the re-
quirements of the kind of work that provided the economic survival had a much higher
priority than the education of the children, the quality of family relationships, or anything
that today would be regarded as “family life.” “Work life” had the first priority, in terms
of compatibility and in terms of work-family balance. Priorities in terms of compatibility
were visible in the restrictions for marriage and parenthood: Those who did not have the
means to provide for a family were not allowed to have one. Parenthood was allowed only
within marriage, and the allowance for marriage was given to farmers with their own land
or craftsmen with their own business. Priorities, in terms of work-family balance, were
visible in social expectations and norms. In the Middle Ages, childhood was not per-
ceived as a life course phase that contained its own needs. Most expectations towards par-
enthood that seem to be self-evident today were not existent. Children were not so much
demanding their parents’ time and energy, competing with economic needs for resources,
but rather an additional resource that was invested into the economic survival of the
household. Everybody who was able had to participate in “professional work.” Also, chil-
dren were often sent away by their parents to work as maids or farm labourers in a differ-
ent household where they were more needed.
By today’s standards, one could say that the work-family balance was quite out of
balance in pre-industrial societies, with “work life” demanding a maximum share of all
available resources. Compatibility was solved in a similarly one-sided manner, with par-
enthood being restricted to those heads of a household who owned a farm or a crafts busi-
ness and who had use for children as labour. However, people did not perceive this imbal-
ance as such because professional work and family life were not separated and because
the expectations regarding a family life beyond these professional activities were low
(Mitterauer/Sieder 1984; Gestrich 2003).
The separation of “work life” and “family life” developed within the industrial society.
With industrial production replacing craft and farming as the way of making a living, for the
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larger part of societies, the work place changed from an individual’s own household to the
factory. The household members were not all involved as a group in the same process or
place of production. This way work life and family life became distinguishable and their
relationship antagonistic. A division of work between family members became the new
normative concept of organising the compatibility of the two spheres, with the male bread-
winner and female homemaker model as a normative ideal. (The ideal was, however, real-
ised by the bourgeoisie rather than by the working class, where women needed to contribute
to the household income. Only in roughly two decades after World War II were most cou-
ples able to put this ideal into practice.) The spatial separation of home and work place – an
early form of introducing job mobility to large parts of the work force – made a division of
responsibilities seem necessary. What occasionally made it possible was the fact that, in in-
dustrial production, a single household member was – sometimes – able to provide a house-
hold income. As a consequence, the expectation arose that the woman should be exempted
from industrial work so that she can take care of household requirements.
It has to be emphasised once more that this was, in the late 19th and early 20th centu-
ries, only a normative concept – a postulated idea of how work-family conflicts could and
should be solved. And it has to be emphasised that factual solutions to work-family con-
flicts in practice highly differentiated between social classes. Working class couples in the
19th century have, for example, hardly been able to exempt women from industrial work.
Often they have given children away. As in pre-modern societies, the economic survival
still had a much higher priority than the fulfilment of family plans or the investment into
family needs. Nevertheless, with the idea of “modern” gender roles, as Durkheim or Par-
sons would call them, serving as a solution to work-family conflicts, ideas and normative
expectations regarding “good” parenthood (or, rather, motherhood) were also formulated.
Again as a normative concept, family life became more challenging in the early modern
society. The 1950s and early 1960s era was the exceptional time span in which all these
expectations were actually met. The fact that one generation had finally managed to meet
the expectations is probably important in order to understand why norms regarding good
parenthood are quite stable today and have increased in recent decades, although the divi-
sion of gender roles that enabled this generation to do so is losing its suitability (Gestrich
2008; Gestrich 2003; Mitterauer/Sieder 1984; Lück 2009).
In late modernity, in post-industrial societies, the solution that Europe had finally found
in the 1950s is questioned by the reorganisation of gender roles. Women are successfully
claiming equal rights and delegitimising the “modern” gender roles of early modernity that
forced women into economic dependency and that now are called “traditional.” Processes of
value change and a second wave of individualisation encouraged women to take the free-
dom of making career choices of their own and to follow their own interests. Partly as a
means for independency, partly as a means for self-fulfilment, women decided to achieve
advanced educational degrees and seek professional careers of their own. The process is
fostered by the transition into post-industrial societies: New jobs in the third and fourth
sector and a more flexible organisation of work simplify women’s entry into the labour
market. At the same time, after the deceleration of the economic expansion in the 1970s,
more households are again dependent on a second household income. As a consequence,
there is an increasing number of couples in which two partners have a general interest in
their own professional careers. With paid work still happening outside of the household, the
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challenge of how to combine the job with a family life is reintroduced into societies. The
delegitimisation of patriarchy makes a new solution necessary. What makes it sometimes
possible are varying circumstances: in some countries, generous parental leave; in others,
generous public childcare facilities or affordable, privately offered childcare services; in the
Netherlands, state support for part-time jobs (Lück 2009; Lück/Hofäcker 2008; Ger-
hards/Hölscher 2003; Lengerer 2004; Pfau-Effinger 1998).
What has not been established yet again is a standard solution. Not only the men-
tioned national policies or welfare regimes create a variety of solutions. There are also
cultural differences that mainly concern the degree by which the former gender role divi-
sion has disappeared or is still persisting. This creates not only cross-national differences
in the solutions to compatibility, but also between social groups within societies. The
cultural change from early to late modernity, in many societies, is still in the flow, as is
the reorganisation of family policies and welfare regimes, offering various solutions for
parents who try to maintain two professional careers. At the same time, economic change
creates differing circumstances. Some jobs are offering flexible working times or the op-
tion to work at home so that combining job and family becomes easier. More often, jobs
demand flexibility in terms of time and place on the employees’ side, so that it becomes
more difficult for the employee to navigate successfully. As a consequence, the question
whether and how work-family conflicts can be solved varies from couple to couple by a
set of conditions on the micro, meso, and macro levels, including the hours and the or-
ganisation of the work of both partners’ jobs, the individual gender role attitudes of the
partners, the predominant gender role culture within the society or social environment,
and the family policies within the nation or community (Lück 2009).
One can summarise that work-family conflicts are a challenge for contemporary so-
cieties because they appear in a new context – in times of post-industrial work life and the
postulation of gender equality. In this context, past solutions no longer work and, so far, a
juxtaposition of old and various new solutions is visible. New solutions cannot be found
by couples alone, but societies as a whole have to establish cultural orientations and infra-
structure support. A set of individual and societal, of cultural and structural conditions,
has to be coordinated. What could be a timeless pattern is that the necessity to organise
economic survival is given a higher priority than realising family plans or living up to ex-
pectations within the family context. If this is true, then increasing demands for job mo-
bility, as any increase in the demands of work life, should have visible effects on com-
patibility, work-family balance, and family life. However, even this rule could change in
late modernity as societies could guarantee economic survival through systems of social
security.
How to study work-family conflicts in contemporary societies – a sketch
for a methodological programme
The current situation is a challenge for both theory and research. The description and ex-
planation of whether and how work-family conflicts can be solved has to take into ac-
count the collection of conditions and solutions mentioned above. Due to a lack of ade-
quate data, this article will not be able to put into practice this postulation in all of its con-
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sequences. However, as a sketch for a methodological programme that may reach beyond
the empirical analyses presented here, it shall formulate what ideally would be necessary
to control for in an empirical analysis – and to reflect in a theoretical explanation.
For explaining the success in combining job and family in contemporary Europe, at
least three fields of circumstances are of major importance:
– Research has to take into account the requirements of both partners’ jobs, inasmuch as
they limit the ability to take on responsibilities in family work: for example, the work
hours, the flexibility in terms of the work hours and work places which the jobs de-
mand, as well as the flexibility that the jobs offer.
– Research has to include gender role attitudes as moderating variables. The orientation
towards a male breadwinner model means that the solution of a full-time mother is
available and likely to be taken. An undiluted ideal of gender equality implies that
two partners share the burden of combining paid work and parenting. A typical con-
temporary set of gender role orientations means that it is mostly the woman who has
to combine these two spheres.
– Research has to reflect the available support for childcare, such as available childcare
facilities or extended family networks.
Taking these observations to a higher level of abstraction, three theses can be formulated:
– Explanations have to take into account the micro and macro level (and, ideally, also
the meso level). Adequate methods to do this are, for example, context analysis and
multi-level analysis. A suitable theory should be a theory of action that includes a mi-
cro-macro link, for example, such as Coleman (1986) suggests it.
– Explanations have to take into account structural constraints and opportunities as
well as cultural normative constructions. Neither a strict rational choice theory nor a
strict theory of social construction is able to capture all probable influences (Lück/
Hofäcker 2008).
– Explanations have to take a couple perspective. In societies in which the gender division
is still strong, the men’s focus on paid work may be prevalent enough so that analyses
could also define women, instead of couples, as units of action. But even then, the male
partner’s work situation is an important context that needs to be considered.
An additional postulation can be made. It is, however, not specific for this research topic
but concerns all research topics in which the direction of causal relationships can be
thought reciprocally or in more than one way (i.e., “Is parenthood postponed because of
job mobility or is job mobility refused because of parenthood?”): To control the direction
of causal effects, longitudinal research design is necessary.
Theory and method
As previously mentioned, the following analyses are not able to put into practice all of the
aforementioned postulations. Given the limitations in available data as well as in space, a
slightly simplified model will be used. Analyses do take a couple perspective. They include
structural constraints and opportunities, as well as cultural normative constructions. How-
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ever, a longitudinal research design is not possible, and the macro level can only be in-
cluded arbitrarily.
The analyses are based on survey data of the project “Job Mobilities and Family Lives
in Europe” (cp. Lück/Schneider in this issue; Huynen et al. 2008; Huynen et al. 2010). It
contains representative data for six European countries (Germany, France, Spain, Swit-
zerland, Poland, and Belgium). Since these are too few countries and because they are not
randomly selected, a multi-level analysis is not an option. Instead, country differences
will be measured by differentiating descriptive analyses and by inserting country dummy
variables into the regression analyses. Given that the survey has individual level data, the
couple perspective is constructed by filtering out respondents who have a stable relation-
ship and by using variables that were collected for the respondent as well as for his or her
partner analogously. For example, respondents were not only asked whether they were
working for pay, but also whether their partner was, so that, depending on the sex of the
respondent, the variables “man is working for pay” and “woman is working for pay” can
be constructed. A second criterion for selecting respondents is an age within the range of
25 to 39, assuming that this is the age span in which work-family conflicts typically occur
and in which family planning, family formation and family life with young children takes
place. All in all, 2077 couples are analysed.
Theoretically, the analyses assume that the couple makes common decisions based on
rational reflections of the relevant circumstances. Relevant circumstances are those that
affect the couple’s available resources in terms of time and energy to invest in two job ca-
reers and/or parenthood. They include the micro and macro level. For simplification, it is
further assumed that the couple has common goals regarding one or two professional ca-
reers, as well as towards family plans that it is trying to realise. Work-family conflicts are
likely to occur if the couple’s goals include two professional careers and children. These
goals are, again, shaped by macro- and meso-level cultural contexts through processes
such as socialisation and value change.
Methodologically speaking, two indicators for attitudes are available that come
close to measuring the couple’s orientation towards a dual career or towards a male
breadwinner concept, as well as towards the decision to remain childless or become
parents. The respondent was asked whether or not he or she agrees that “it is usually
better for the children if the man is the main provider and the woman takes care of the
home and the family.” This variable is used as a proxy for the woman’s career orienta-
tion: Those couples in which the respondent fully agrees (as one optional answer on a
four point scale) will be excluded from analyses, assuming that the couple follows a
male breadwinner role model and, therefore, does not perceive many work-family con-
flicts. The respondent was also asked whether or not he or she “intends to have a(nother)
child within the next three years.” This indicator measures the couples’ immediate fam-
ily plan. It might work as an interaction effect, intensifying the work-family conflict;
however, it might even reflect a selection effect by selecting those whose situation is
untroubled enough that concrete family planning is realistic. In any case, it is not a de-
cent indicator for measuring whether or not a couple generally wishes to have children
in the long run. So, it will not be used for a further limitation of the sample. Instead, it
will be arbitrarily assumed that all couples have at least a latent wish to become par-
ents.
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Given the reciprocal complex causal relationships, analyses will not operationalise the
successful combination of two professional careers and family life in one indicator. Instead,
two separate causal analyses will take the female partner’s full-time employment as the de-
pendent variable in a first step. In a second step, the explained variable will be whether or
not the couple has children. This allows the ability to determine which of the two goals is
more likely to suffer from which unfavourable circumstances. It also allows for the use of
female employment and children as explanatory variables in the other model.
The explanatory variables in the models operationalise the aforementioned circum-
stances that the couple reflects in making a decision. They include both partners’ job
situations as well as support for childcare. The job situation is operationalised by includ-
ing work hours, flexibility of working time, the limitation of the work contract, and, of
course, by being mobile for the job. Job mobility here is conceptualised as ongoing recur-
ring mobility. It includes daily long-distance commuting, frequent overnight travel, and
living in a long-distance relationship, due to job-related reasons (cp. Lück/Schneider in
this issue). Residential mobility is not included. The support for childcare may consist of
public childcare, grandparents, friends, or paid private support. Aside from public child-
care that partly reflects family policies, macro-level conditions are modelled undifferenti-
ated by measuring country differences.
Although work-family conflicts may have many outcomes – for example, the reduc-
tion in work hours, a less prestigious job, or an older age at first birth – the analyses here
can only focus on a few. Therefore, with the selection of explained variables – the
woman’s full-time employment and parenthood – the focus is made on the aspect of com-
patibility. Before approaching the multi-variate models, binary analyses that have a more
descriptive character will be presented.
Are mobile couples less successful in solving work-family conflicts?
The range of combinations of two partners’ professional situations, as well as their family
circumstances, is complex. A quantitative analysis has to narrow down this range by re-
ducing the complexity to a small set of ideal type forms that, nevertheless, describe a
large share of empirical reality. This is accomplished in the following Figure 1 by distin-
guishing four groups. Dual-earner parents represent those who have managed to combine
two full-time jobs and children. If one partner only works part-time (i.e., less than 35
hours per week), the couple is classified as a 1.5 earner. If one partner does not work at
all, then the couple is classified as single-earner parents. Under the (again idealised) as-
sumption that the couple would prefer two full jobs, these two categories present one way
of cutting back and failing the aspired ideal.3 The second way to cut back is by not having
children. This solution is represented by the category of childless couples. The small
group of couples without any full-time employed partner is excluded from the comparison
                                                       
3 One could, of course, also assume that couples would rather combine two part-time jobs with par-
enthood. This, however, will only be true if attractive part-time jobs are available. For these analy-
ses, a simplified general assumption was necessary and, for the studied countries, the assumption of
couples that prefer full-time jobs seemed closer to reality.
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as a “residual category” because their situation presumably does not reflect a decision of
how to react to incompatibility.
The distribution of couples over these four categories is differentiated according to
whether the woman, the man, or neither of the two partners is recurringly mobile for job-
related reasons. Again, a few cases are excluded from the analyses: Those couples in
which both partners are mobile are not enough to calculate a fourth distribution and there
is no good reason to merge them with any of the other three.
Comparing the three distributions allows a first, bi-variate impression of the ways in
which mobility affects a couple’s ability to realise two professional careers and become
parents. The larger the white bar, the more couples are successful. The larger the black
bar, the more couples have not (yet) managed to have children. The longer the grey bars,
the more couples have at least temporarily cut back on one of the professional careers.
Figure 1: Couples’ childlessness and number of jobs by job mobility
Data: Job Mobilities and Family Lives in Europe. Couples with respondent aged 25 to 39, not fully agreeing
that “it is usually better for the children if the man is the main provider and the woman takes care of the
home and the family.” Comparison of couples in which neither partner, the man, or the woman is recur-
ringly mobile for job-related reasons. Residual categories (e.g., both partners not employed, both partners
part-time employed, both partners recurringly mobile) have been excluded from the analysis. Case numbers
for couples with a mobile woman are low (n between 30 and 54). Weighted data (w-nation4).
                                                       
4 For a documentation of the weights, see Huynen et al. 2010.
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The figure reveals several insights. The most notable result is that couples are seldom sin-
gle-earner couples if the woman is recurringly mobile. This may seem like a methodological
artefact: Anyone who is mobile for job reasons can hardly not be working for pay. So, if one
partner is mobile, the statistical likelihood decreases that one partner is not working for pay.
The finding is, however, also an empirical, albeit well-known, result. It becomes visi-
ble when we compare couples with mobile women and couples with mobile men. The fact
that the man is mobile does not generally decrease the chance that the couple is a single-
earner couple. In some countries, the chance even rises. These gender-specific reactions
to recurring mobility document the principally persisting (although weakened) gender
roles. Men mostly have a strong professional career orientation and might try to integrate
a family into their lives as a second priority; women still tend to take on the full responsi-
bility for the children and try, in addition, to have a professional career. In situations of
work-family conflicts, men will almost always cut in their family engagement, whereas
women, in comparison, will more often cut back in their engagement on the labour mar-
ket. As a consequence, men do not react to their female partner’s job mobility with re-
ducing or interrupting paid work. The couple will be a dual-earner couple and postpone or
give up family plans if necessary. Women partly react to their male partner’s job mobility
by reducing or interrupting paid work, so that the ratio of single-earner couples remains
similar to those in which neither partner is mobile.
A second, more surprising, result is that job mobility does not necessarily have visible
consequences in terms of a failure in combining two professional careers and children. The
white bars, indicating success in that respect, is seldom shorter for couples who experience
mobility. They only tend to be shifted to the right side. Job mobility increases the risk of
being childless, but not at the cost of dual-earner parent couples; rather, it is at the cost of
single-earner couples. The smaller ratio of single-earner couples among mobiles seems,
again, self-evident: One partner being mobile for the job implies that this partner is working
for pay; this leaves only one (instead of two) partners who might not be in the labour mar-
ket. Therefore, the couple’s likelihood to be a single-earner couple is reduced. And indeed,
this result, at least partly, reflects a selection effect. It is caused by the fact that mobility is
more likely to occur among dual-earner couples (cp. Collet/Bonnet in this issue; Lück/Rup-
penthal 2010). And yet, this is not a methodological artefact. It implies that people who ex-
perience job-related mobility make different priorities. They are typically recruited among
those who are more job-oriented and would rather postpone or give up family plans. If a
couple with different priorities would be confronted with the demand to become mobile,
perhaps they would look for a different job – and not appear in the statistics as mobile.
A third result is that the national context matters. The aforementioned patterns are
true for all six countries included in the survey. However, the general spread of childless-
ness and of single-earner couples varies, as does the degree of gender difference in the re-
action to mobility. In the figure, France, Belgium, and Poland show a large share of cou-
ples who have succeeded in combining two professional careers and parenthood. In Ger-
many and Switzerland, these shares are rather small. This indicates high compatibility in
the first group of countries and low compatibility in the latter, which is consistent with
known cultural and structural patterns: Germany and Switzerland have a relatively strong
expectation regarding the role of the mother as the primary caregiver and little institu-
tional childcare support. France, Poland, and Belgium have culturally established role
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models of mothers working for pay. In France and Belgium, this role model is based on
the idea of gender equality and accompanied by good childcare support. In Poland, it is
based on the economic need of a second household income (Lück 2009; Lück/Hofäcker
2008). The share of childless couples is generally relatively high in Germany. It is very low
in Belgium and Poland. These differences are also consistent with known country-specific
patterns (OECD Family Database 2009). Also they mainly reflect (in)compatibility, perhaps
with a stronger emphasis on structural support and flexibilisation of paid work.
The effects of recurring mobility on compatibility are especially strong in Germany,
France, and Poland. In the same countries, these effects are, at the same time, much more
gender-specific than in Spain, Switzerland, or Belgium. In fact, the strong effects are visi-
ble, almost only if women are recurringly mobile, yet hardly if men are. This pattern is
somewhat surprising and does not conform to most typologies known from the literature.
It partly serves as a reminder of the spread of “traditional” versus “modern” gender roles
with Germany and, in some ways, also Poland, emphasising differences that are stronger
than they are in other countries. This correspondence would be plausible in the sense that
effects should be gender-specific, especially where the different responsibilities of men as
income providers and women as homemakers are emphasised. However, the numbers for
France, Spain, and Switzerland do not neatly fit into this scheme (Lück 2009). A second
correspondence may be the spread of mobility forms. In Germany, France, and, in some
ways, also in Poland, job-related overnight travel is relatively frequent, whereas the other
countries are predominantly characterised by daily long-distance commuting (Lück/Rup-
penthal 2010). This may explain the different strengths of effects of recurring mobility on
compatibility: In Germany, France, and Poland, recurring mobility stands for overnight
absences much more often than in Spain, Switzerland, or Belgium. And it is plausible that
overnight travel burdens the compatibility more than daily commutes.
Does mobility have similar effects as other potential causes of work-family
conflicts?
The following Figure 2 shows the effect of recurring mobility of the male or the female
partner for the population of all six countries as a whole. The main patterns, which are de-
scribed above, are visible. This effect is compared to the effects of other circumstances
that are likely to affect compatibility: the question of whether or not one of the partners
regularly works more than 45 hours per week; has a time-limited work contract (or no
contract at all); is “totally or mainly free to choose his or her work hours;” and whether
the couple receives any form of external help for childcare or housework. This includes
having children at a kindergarten or other childcare facility, having grandparents or
friends occasionally providing childcare, as well as private professional help for childcare
or for household chores. Again, the bars indicate how many couples, under these circum-
stances, have one, 1.5, or two jobs and how many are childless. Only for the comparison
of whether or not the couple receives childcare support, childless couples are excluded
from the comparison.
Results show that these other circumstances have somewhat similar influences as those
of recurring job mobility. The effect of having long work hours is practically identical. This
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could be read as a confirmation that a major burden of being mobile for the job is that the
travel takes away further couple or family time – just the same as overtime does.
A limited work contract could indicate an insecure economic situation that does not
allow long-term binding commitments, such as having children, at least as a statistical
tendency. In theory only, from this condition a postponement of parenthood would be a
plausible consequence. The analysis confirms such an effect – if it is the man who has the
time-limited contract. However, the ratio of childless couples is only marginally higher
and the ratio of single-earner couples is higher as well. If the woman’s job is uncertain, as
previously described, only a selection effect is visible: In that case, the couple is very
likely not a single-earner couple, since the woman at least has a work contract. The gen-
der difference is plausible, given that men typically hold the position of the main provider
of the household income so that only in their job career does insecurity matter. What is
surprising is that the effect is generally rather weak. It seems as if either a limited contract
is not perceived as insecurity very often or that the economic situation is considered
somewhat insecure anyway, with or without an unlimited work contract.
Figure 2: Couples’ childlessness and number of jobs by other circumstances
Data: Job Mobilities and Family Lives in Europe. Couples with respondent aged 25 to 39, not fully agreeing
that “it is usually better for the children if the man is the main provider and the woman takes care of the
home and the family.” Comparison of couples in which neither partner, the man, or the woman is recur-
ringly mobile for job-related reasons. Residual categories (e.g., both partners not employed, both partners
part-time employed, both partners recurringly mobile) have been excluded from the analysis. The compari-
son regarding childcare support excludes childless couples. Weighted data (w-proportion).
Zeitschrift für Familienforschung, 22. Jahrg., Heft 2/2010, S. 216-241 229
The circumstance that partners are able to choose their work hours more or less freely
should increase compatibility and support parenthood and family planning. A reciprocal
effect would also be plausible with parents negotiating for more freedom in organising
their work hours according to their needs. For both reasons, it would be expectable that at
least one partner who has this freedom should correlate with the couple that has children.
However, this is not the case. There may be a more complex causal relation – perhaps
flexible work hours reduce stress for employed parents. A general effect on compatibility
and family formation is not visible.
What is plausible is the effect of childcare support. If a couple receives help to care
for the children, be it by relatives, friends, privately paid, or public institutions, the part-
ners in this couple have a clearly higher chance of realising two full-time professional ca-
reers. The ratio of single-earner parents is significantly lower. However, here again, a
causal influence in the opposite direction is also likely: Dual-earner parents organise ex-
ternal support rather than single-earner parents do.
Multivariate analysis, part I: Consequences for family formation
After describing the distribution of couples regarding parenthood and number of em-
ployed partners, as a first bi-variate approach to a causal explanation, a multi-variate
analysis shall give answers with more reliable empirical evidence. As previously de-
scribed, this analysis will be divided into two steps. In the first step, the dependent vari-
able is the question of whether or not the couple has children. In the second step, the de-
pendent variable is whether or not the female partner is working full-time or part-time for
pay. This division allows for the inclusion of the woman’s job situation (i.e., work hours,
flexibility etc.) as explanatory variables in the first step and the family situation in the
second step without introducing major biases through selection effects. The two depend-
ent variables are only the two most crucial indicators for the success or failure of com-
bining a job career and a family, indicating that circumstances are supportive in terms of
compatibility. Other aspects, such as whether or not the male partner is employed full-
time or the woman is satisfied with her job, will be left for future research.
The model that is presented in Table 1 includes the aforementioned explanatory vari-
ables. Additionally, it takes into account whether or not the partners are working for pay
at all, whether they work full-time and whether or not they have university degrees. The
university degree is a proxy for a support for equal gender roles as well as for job orienta-
tion on the woman’s side. It is known that women with advanced education are more
likely to be in the labour market and to remain childless for a longer amount of time,
partly because advanced education implies a high investment in human capital that offers
more opportunities on the labour market. It also suggests an increased opportunity cost for
interrupting a job career, partly because the academic social milieu transports corre-
sponding values and role models. Age is controlled for in the model because it naturally
explains variance, also within the restricted sample of respondents aged 25 to 39.
The overall explanatory power of the model is satisfying (Nagelkerkes R2=.401). The
standardised regression coefficients confirm several results that were already visible in
the bi-variate analyses.
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Table 1: Circumstances fostering couples’ family foundation (logistic regression)
Exp(B) Sig.
man: is working for pay 1.338 .314
woman: is working for pay .709 .033
man: is working full-time (35h or more) .950 .775
woman: is working full-time (35h or more) .508 .000
man: is working overtime (45h or more) 1.224 .108
woman: is working overtime (45h or more) .608 .005
man: is recurringly mobile for the job .723 .010
woman: is recurringly mobile for the job .598 .001
man: can choose work hours freely 1.085 .563
woman: can choose work hours freely 1.231 .234
man: has time-limited work contract .816 .222
woman: has time-limited work contract 1.075 .636
man: has university degree .646 .000










Data: Job Mobilities and Family Lives in Europe. Couples with respondent aged 25 to 39, not fully
agreeing that “it is usually better for the children if the man is the main provider and the woman takes
care of the home and the family.” Dependent variable: Couple has children (in our outside the house-
hold). Unweighted data.
The limitation of work contracts does not affect the family foundation in a significant sta-
tistical way, although the coefficients point to expectable directions and a man’s limited
contract may have a weak influence. This result is surprising. As argued before, it proba-
bly has to be stated that limited work contracts are only one way among others that indi-
cate how jobs can be insecure today, and they may even not always be perceived as inse-
cure if the employee has good reason to expect to receive a new work contract without
interruption. In some branches that have limited contracts as a standard, there already may
also be an effect of getting used to insecurity and ignoring it in family planning. The
flexibility of work hours does not significantly affect the family foundation either. The
reasons may be that the flexibility is not always only on the employee’s side, although the
question was formulated this way, but because it is partly demanded by employers or job
responsibilities, or that some employees only have the freedom of choosing which “23 out
of 24 hours” they prefer to work.
Work hours do have a strong and significant effect. However, this is only true in the
female partner’s job. The man’s work hours do not show effects at all. This may reflect
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that the deviation from the standard of a full-time professional career is simply too rare
among men to have any statistical explaining power. It certainly also reflects “traditional”
gender roles that define that childcare needs a mother, rather than the father, to reduce
work. For the same reason, the circumstances in which the female partner has a job or
works full-time or even overtime reduces the chance that the couple has children clearly.
Remarkably, job mobility shows clear effects, not only if it occurs in the woman’s
jobs, but also if it occurs in the man’s job. If any of the partners must commute long dis-
tances or attend to overnight business travel frequently, then the chance that the couple
has children is significantly reduced. For the reasons mentioned above, women’s mobility
has a stronger effect than the mobility of men. As the effects of other indicators, it can be
assumed that a part of this statistical effect is due to a selection effect and indicates a re-
versed causal relation: Couples with children – or with concrete family plans – will try to
avoid job mobility and jobs with many work hours more often and more rigorously than
childless couples will. However, the effect, as designed in the regression model, is simi-
larly plausible and certainly also true: Once a couple is confronted with job mobility, it is
less likely that they will make or realise family plans soon. Compared to other character-
istics of the work situation, job mobility has a strong impact on the compatibility of pro-
fessional careers and family life. Unlike other aspects, it is perceived as an obstacle for
realising parenthood, even for the less challenging father role.
The educational degree works as it was hypothesised and as it is known from the lit-
erature: People with academic degrees are less likely to be parents than those without.
Additionally to the explanation that rational choice theories give, interpreting education as
human capital that increases the opportunity costs for interrupting or reducing profes-
sional work, (Becker 1993) it can be assumed that the academic social milieu is more ac-
cepting of childlessness than others and socialises women and men to seek self-fulfilment
in a professional career.
The dummy variables that measure national differences show highly significant and
highly relevant effects. With Germany as a reference, France, Belgium, and especially
Poland have a multiplied likelihood that couples have children. Only Spain has a slightly
higher likelihood that barely fails to be significant. Switzerland does not deviate from the
German pattern. These effects correspond to different overall levels in fertility.5 The only
clear exception in this comparison is Poland: It shows a higher likelihood of being a par-
ent in the regression analysis although it, meanwhile, has a low total fertility rate. The
reason is that couples in Poland, as in most other East European countries, have children
at a younger age (OECD Family Database 2008). Therefore, within the cross-sectionally
studied age span (with respondents being 25 to 39), there are more parents although the
overall fertility is not higher.
There are several macro-level circumstances that cause the national differences. Re-
search has emphasised cultural differences as well as different family policies (Gerhards/
Hölscher 2003; van Oorschot/Opielka/Pfau-Effinger 2008; Weiss 2000; Kaufmann 2002;
Lewis/Ostner 1994; Lengerer 2004). West Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and Southern
Europe are known to cherish strong social expectations towards the mother role and offer
                                                       
5 The 2007 total fertility rates are for Germany: 1.37; France: 1.98; Spain: 1.40; Switzerland: 1.46;
Poland: 1.31; Belgium: 1.81 (Eurostat 2009).
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little support for parents in terms of public childcare. Scandinavia, France, and Belgium
are examples for a more generous support, partly motivated by a strong cultural belief in
gender equality; in the French case, it is also motivated by defining higher birth rates as a
political goal (Veil 2004). In socialist times, countries in Eastern Europe also had the goal
of enhancing birth rates as well as of supporting female labour market participation. This
pattern has also been culturally established and partly persists until the present (Hofäcker
2006). The female labour market participation remains high, while births have severely
dropped and/or have been postponed to a slightly older age. Both culture and policies are
closely linked by reciprocal influences that generally are hard to untangle empirically.
Pfau-Effinger has suggested conceptualising the sets of gender culture and gender struc-
ture as gender arrangement (Pfau-Effinger 1998). (The age affect is trivial and controlled
for in the model only to avoid third variable effects.)
Multivariate analysis, part II: Consequences for women’s job careers
After the first step in multi-variate analyses of compatibility of job careers and family life,
the second step follows. This time, the dependent variable is the question of whether or
not the female partner is working for pay. This question allows for different explanatory
variables. Attributes of the female partner’s job are, of course, only existent under the
condition that she has a job at all. They are, in other words, extremely correlated to the
dependent variable and therefore cannot be taken into account in the model. Instead, the
family situation, which was not part of the previous model for analogue reasons, can now
be taken into account. The analysis shows the strength of the resources of time and energy
that parenthood requires and the fact that the male partner’s job requires the burden of the
realisation of a professional career for the woman. Job mobility, as experienced by the
male partner, is again tested and compared to the other circumstances’ effects.
The overall explanatory power of the model is rather dissatisfying (Nagelkerkes
R2=.151). This means that the fact of whether or not a female partner in a couple is
working for pay is either not strongly affected by any external circumstances, or it is more
affected by circumstances that are not included in the model or, likely, the data. However,
convincing theoretical arguments about which other circumstances these should be and
why are missing. A plausible interpretation, therefore, is that female employment is in-
deed less affected by the family situation than the family situation is affected by female
employment. (Age, which had a very strong impact in the previous model, has no addi-
tional explanatory power on this dependent variable and is left out of the model.) Never-
theless, even if more variance remains unexplained, there are effects that are documented
in the standardised regression coefficients. Some of them are surprising in their direction.
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Table 2: Circumstances fostering partnered women’s paid work (logistic regression)
Exp(B) Sig.
man: is working for pay 1.960 .013
man: is working full-time (35h or more) 1.113 .554
man: is working overtime (45h or more) .724 .012
man: is recurringly mobile for the job 1.005 .967
man: can choose work hours freely 1.275 .111
man: has time-limited work contract .541 .000
man: has university degree .817 .125
woman: has university degree 2.388 .000
couple has children .670 .092
number of children .802 .003
couple has children under age 6 .411 .000
couple receives support for childcare or housework 2.491 .000








Data: Job Mobilities and Family Lives in Europe. Couples with respondent aged 25 to 39, not fully agreeing
that “it is usually better for the children if the man is the main provider and the woman takes care of the home
and the family.” Dependent variable: Woman is working for pay (full-time or part-time). Unweighted data.
If the male partner is working for pay, the chance rises that the female partner has a job.
But if he works more than 44 hours a week, the chance decreases. It is plausible that a
man can invest work hours beyond a common 40 hours per week in his professional job
more easily if he has a housewife who frees him from any household or childcare respon-
sibilities. So, it is plausible that there are reciprocal causal influences between a man
working overtime and his female partner working at all and that both may be negotiated
by the couple together. In the rare event that the man is not working for pay at all, it
would be plausible that the woman compensates his missing contribution to the household
income with paid work. Statistically, the opposite is true: If he doesn’t have a job, she
tends not to have a job either. This correlation may be due to a selection effect, for exam-
ple, based on student couples in which both partners are not yet in the labour market. It
may also reflect the known tendency of homogamy that couples are less stable if partners
have different socio-economic backgrounds, especially if the female partner has a higher
social position than the man (Lenz 2009).
It is also surprising that the woman’s likelihood to have a job decreases if the male
partner’s job is based on a time-limited contract. Again, one could assume that an inse-
cure income on the man’s side should be a reason why the woman should also provide an
income. And, again, similar selection effects might explain why this is, at least in a statis-
tically measurable way, not the case. The question of whether or not the man can choose
his work hours freely does not have an effect at all – just like in the previous model.
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The influence of the family situation appears to be quite plausible. Whether or not the
couple has children as such does not significantly reduce the woman’s likelihood to have a
job. But the effect is close to being significant. And, for the presence of young children up
to the age of five, the effect is highly significant and highly relevant. Also, with a higher
number of children it becomes less probable that the female partner is working for pay.
Summarising, these numbers can be interpreted in a way that the more time and energy
that have to be invested by a couple into childcare, which is typically provided by women,
the less likely it is that the female partner still has enough time and energy left to also pur-
sue a professional career of her own. The fourth number also fits into this picture: If the
couple receives external support by sending children to a kindergarten, by having a house-
keeper or a nanny, by receiving childcare from friends or grandparents, then the woman’s
chance to work for pay multiplies. This support, as mentioned earlier, may also be the con-
sequence, rather than the cause, of the woman’s engagement in the labour market.
What is surprising, but consistent with the bi-variate analyses, is the fact that a male
partner’s job mobility does not affect the employment of his female partner. For the same
reason why a man working 45 hours or more a week decreases his partner’s chance of be-
ing engaged in the labour market, it would also be plausible that a job-mobile man is more
likely to have a housewife without a professional career than a man who returns home from
work within a couple of minutes each evening. This is not the case. Again, one explanation
is a selection effect: As mentioned before, dual-earner couples have a higher chance to be
confronted with job mobility than single-earner couples (cp. Collet/Bonnet in this issue).
But, nevertheless, it is remarkable that there is not also an effect in terms of reducing
women’s engagement on the labour market that would outweigh this selection effect.
Highly significant and plausible is the effect of women’s education. Those with an
academic degree have a multiplied chance of having a job. Again, there is one interpreta-
tion, based on human capital, that has already been mentioned and one based on milieu-
specific socialisation: It can be assumed that the academic social milieu socialises women
to be more demanding in terms of economic independency and self-fulfilment in their
own professional careers. Analogously it would be plausible to assume that men with uni-
versity degrees are socialised to be more sensitive and supportive for women’s interests.
The fact that the male partner’s educational degree does not have an effect at all on the
woman’s engagement in the labour market questions this theoretical perspective.
Finally, we see country effects. They become evident in directions that are consistent
with the previous model, with France and Belgium fostering female employment more
than Germany, Switzerland, or Spain. However, the strength of the effects is much
weaker than it was in the previous model. All in all, it seems that couples react to external
circumstances and incompatibility, rather with compromises in family planning and fam-
ily foundation, than with compromises in the female partner’s labour market engagement.
Support from the respondents’ subjective evaluation
The data also allow measurement of the reciprocal interrelations between family and pro-
fessional work that are captured by the aforementioned regression analyses in another
way. The survey includes several questions that ask the respondent to subjectively evalu-
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ate these influences. Respondents without children were asked about several potential job-
related reasons for their childlessness, including various forms of being job mobile (Fig-
ure 3). All respondents were asked whether their duties for childcare and housework bur-
dened the success of their professional careers (Figure 4). These evaluations contain all of
the advantages and disadvantages that subjective indicators always have: On the one
hand, they may be biased by the subjective perception of the respondent and by reactivity;
on the other hand, they are free of third variable effects that may not be controlled for in a
regression analysis. The subjective indicators may not be a good alternative to multi-
variate analyses of objective indicators; however, they are a very valuable supplement. If
they confirm the results of the regression analyses above, then they crucially increase the
reliability of these results.
Figure 3: Subjective evaluation of the reasons for childlessness
Data: Job Mobilities and Family Lives in Europe. Upper figure: Childless couples with respondent aged
25 to 39. Comparison of couples in which neither partner, the man, or the woman is recurringly mobile
for job-related reasons. The residual category (i.e., both partners are recurringly mobile) has been ex-
cluded from the analysis. Lower figure: Childless couples with respondent aged 25 to 39 who states that
the job-related reasons were “not important at all” for the reason why they don’t have children. Weighted
data (w-proportion).
The first indicator in Figure 3 confirms the gender difference in the effects of job re-
quirements on family foundation. Job-mobile men and women with mobile partners do
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not have a higher tendency to perceive job-related reasons as important for the fact that
they do not have children. Mobile women and men with a mobile partner do. The share of
those who evaluate this influence as “very important” almost doubles from 14% to 26%.
This supports the interpretation that, under the condition of persisting gender roles, the
hours that are taken away from the female partner by job requirements have more severe
consequences for the realisation of family plans than the hours that the male partner in-
vests in his job career.
The set of further indicators in Figure 3, which measure the evaluation of specific
characteristics of the job situation, confirms two additional results. The indicator “one
partner’s job” is actually the aggregation of two indicators in the data set, transferring an-
swers to the couple level. The variable indicates that the respondent has either said “yes”
to the question “Is your job a reason – for example, too much work, stress, or responsibil-
ity?” or to the equivalent question “Is your partner’s job a reason?” Thereby it measures
consequences of a high work load of any of the two partners within a couple. More than
half of the respondents evaluate the work load as being important. This is consistent with
the result from Table 1 that shows that many work hours decrease the chance to become a
parent.
Figure 3 also confirms the influence of job mobility. Not only is the work load con-
sidered to be more important by people who are personally or through their partners con-
fronted with job mobility than by those who are not. Job mobility itself is also mentioned
as being an important cause. The indicators are differentiated by the type of mobility.
Living in a long-distance relationship for job-related reasons is most often seen as a rea-
son for not having children. Frequent job-related overnight travel is the second most im-
portant cause. Daily long-distance commuting is still relevant but less important. One can
summarise that the longer the phases in which job mobility separates the partners spa-
tially, the greater the perception that its consequences for the couple’s lack of children are
important.
There are some additional insights from the subjective indicators. They reveal that
unemployment and financially tight situations can also be reasons not to have children.
And they show that a job-related relocation is also sometimes perceived as a reason why
the couple has not (yet) founded a family – especially if the relocation experience is in
addition to a recurring mobility that the couple also is confronted with.
Figure 4 also confirms a previous result: The professional career seems to be less af-
fected by aggravations of the work-family conflict than the family career. People who
have a recurringly mobile partner do not clearly agree more often than others that “Your
job career could have been more successful if you had had fewer responsibilities for
housework and care-giving.” Men disagree with this statement more often than women,
which reflects the well-known gender role patterns. A somewhat higher agreement for
men with a mobile partner could be concluded from the ratios of full agreement and full
disagreement. However, if the variable was dichotomised by putting agreement against
disagreement, the opposite tendency would be measured. So these differences need to be
interpreted as “white noise” instead of as a correlation. The same is true for the differ-
ences in agreement between women with a mobile partner and women with a non-mobile
partner. This means that if one partner in a couple becomes recurringly mobile for job-
related reasons, it does not lead to a cutback in the other partner’s professional career, at
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least not in the other partner’s subjective perception. Instead, it probably leads to cutting
back family plans.
Figure 4: Subjective evaluation of the consequences of childcare duties for one’s own
professional career
Data: Job Mobilities and Family Lives in Europe. Respondents aged 25 to 39 with a partner. Weighted
data (w-proportion).
In summary, it can be stated that the subjective indicators do confirm the main results of
the regression analyses: Women’s career orientation is not significantly affected by the
family situation. The family biography, however, does suffer if the partners’ job situations
are demanding. Given the persisting gender role patterns, the woman’s job situation is
crucial in this respect.
Discussion
It has been argued that, in late modernity and with women’s increasing career orientation
and refusal of a male breadwinner concept, couples run into increasing challenges of
compatibility of professional work and family life. Since both spheres compete for a lim-
ited amount of resources in terms of time and energy, it is possible that individuals and
couples are unable to invest enough in each sphere to meet all role expectations. This is
especially true for the life course phase of early adulthood, in which not only family plans
are usually made, but also professional careers are typically established and job mobility
is frequent. The consequences may be the failure in realising all goals, in terms of both
partners having professional careers and being parents, as analysed in this article. They
may also be more subtle, such as having conflicts with the partner or with colleagues. The
degree of compatibility is improved or worsened by a variety of circumstances, such as
the flexibility of work hours or the availability of childcare support. Among these circum-
stances, the necessity to be recurringly spatially mobile for the job, such as via long-
distance commuting or by taking frequent business trips, etc., is an important issue that
has been overlooked in social science research. If it proves to severely aggravate work-
family conflicts, such will be an increasing social problem in the future because job mo-
bility has increased in European societies throughout recent decades.
First of all, the results show that, in general, the relationship between work life and
family life is not symmetrical: Family planning and family foundation are more affected
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by the woman’s job situation than vice versa. Given that the analyses focus on couples,
this observation very likely reflects priorities that the couples make rather than con-
straints: If two professional careers and parenthood seem to be incompatible, then for
most young couples, the two jobs come first. As far as this main priority seems to be
achievable at all, the partners probably tend to invest whatever it requires without rational
reflection on a daily basis. Whether or not the secondary goal, mostly the family plans,
can be achieved in addition is the remaining question that couples perceive as a challenge.
Its answer depends on how many resources are left to invest after the primary goal is sat-
isfyingly realised.
There are a number of explanations why couples may define two professional careers
as their primary goal instead of becoming parents. Individuals have probably defined this
priority before finding a partner and making common plans as a couple. In this situation, a
professional career can be pursued through personal effort, whereas realising family plans
is dependent on the fortune of finding the “right” partner in time and is, therefore, a risky
goal. Certainly, the concern about economic existence is also more fundamental than the
wish to have children. And a personal income is a much safer way to secure one’s eco-
nomic existence than relying on finding and keeping a partner who could provide one. A
third explanation is the wish to be economically independent within a stable partnership
because the (in)dependency affects the relation of power and the gender roles in the cou-
ple. Finally, a professional career may seem, to many women and men, to be a more
promising way of achieving self-fulfilment and identification than being a full-time
mother or father. All in all, rising insecurity in the labour market, rising instability of cou-
ple relationships, and processes of value change and individualisation may explain why
job orientation today outweighs family orientation – after a historically exceptional phase
in the 1950s and 1960s in which this may have been somewhat different (especially for
women).
Nevertheless, today there also may be different priorities that define which goal is
pursued if several seem to be incompatible. In the analyses, this fact is more reflected in
circumstances that are likely to shape these preferences than in the preferences them-
selves. The educational attainment, for example, affects the likelihood whether the couple
has children or whether the woman has a job, partly because people with an academic de-
gree tend to have preferences different from those without. There are other circumstances
that influence the preference structure. In any case, knowing the preferences means
knowing which goal will be realised if both spheres would require more resources than
the couple feels able to invest.
Under the condition that couples do have a principle interest in having two jobs and a
family life, several circumstances become relevant that make it more or less likely that
these goals can all be reached. Surprisingly, there is no empirical evidence that the free-
dom of choosing work hours or the limitation of work contracts are among them. Also,
the male partner’s work hours have no significant influence, whereas the question of
whether and how many hours the female partner works for pay is crucial. This means that
cultural aspects and subjective preferences come into play as interaction effects another
time. As long as men are not thought of as being equally responsible for childcare, their
professional situation is not (as) relevant for the couples’ perception of being able to real-
ise family plans.
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Compared to other aspects of the job situation, recurring job mobility has strong ef-
fects on the work-family conflict. However, as for other aspects, it cannot be stated that it
necessarily aggravates it in all cases. It clearly reduces the statistical chance of having a
family, but job mobility of one partner does not decrease the chance that the other partner
is working for pay. This probably partly reflects a selection effect that job mobiles tend to
recruit themselves among rather job-oriented people. Mobile couples will, therefore,
rather cut back on the family investment than the career investment if two goals are in-
compatible – just as other job oriented people would do. In other words, if they have to
make choices, they tend to make career-oriented choices more often than non-mobile
couples, but they do not necessarily have to make more choices. Another influence comes
into play: Couples may become mobile because they want to combine two professional
careers and parenthood. For example, a parent may take on a job with a distant workplace
and a very long daily commute, and not relocate, so that the children do not lose their
friends and do not need to change schools.
The analyses here have concentrated on only two major aspects of combining profes-
sional careers with family life. As argued before, there are several more that merit atten-
tion by further research. One of them is analysed by Viry, Widmer, and Kaufmann (in this
issue): Under certain circumstances regarding the process of how a couple becomes mo-
bile, mobility may burden the partnership quality. Job mobility as such does not have this
effect. Therefore, there is little evidence that the lack of time of a mobile partner as such
and his inability to invest more into couple or family life provokes partner conflicts or
separations. Also, Gerardo Meil’s results on this issue are relevant to the question that is
raised here: They show that job mobility not only prevents family formation, but it may
also reduce the number of children. And, more often, it only postpones births.
The analyses presented here are limited by data and space. The causal influences that
lie behind the country effects deserve more attention in the future. Also, the direction and
mechanisms of causal influences on the couple level could be studied in a better way as
soon as suitable data are available. The analyses in this article are a cross-sectional at-
tempt to capture complex reciprocal causal relationships. They could be studied more
adequately with longitudinal data within a couple career perspective.
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